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ABSTRACT: This contribution revolves around the concept of musical sense-making. Starting from 
the seminal works of Peirce, Dewey and James, it focusses on the musical experience, which can be 
defined from an empiricist position as a process that calls forth epistemic interactions with the sounds. 
Central in this approach is the tension between the richness and fullness of the musical experience 
and the cognitive economy of symbolic abstraction. Dewey, in particular, has stressed the role of hav­
ing an experience proper as a kind of heightened vitality. James, on the contrary, has dealt with the 
distinction between percept and concept, stressing the role of knowledge-by-acquaintance as the kind 
of knowledge we have of something by its presentation to the senses. In what he coined as radical 
empiricism he states that the significance of concepts always consists in their relation to perceptual 
particulars, which, in turn, are embedded in a conceptual map. This map can be described in semiotic 
terms, which holds a symbolic approach to cognition to the extent that it is concerned with signs rather 
than with sensory realia. The question should be raised, however, as to the nature of these signs. There 
is, in fact, a critical distinction between internal and external semantics with signs referring primarily 
to themselves or to something external to the music. In an attempt to bring these claims together, it 
is argued that musical signs should provide a self-referential semantics for which the abstract is really 
material, a real semiotics of singular potential wich is grounded in the real and natural experience. 
Reying on some grounding work of Peirce and Morris and the relation between signs and tool using, 
a theoretical framework is introduced that has at least some operational power in going beyond a merely 
acoustic description of the music as it sounds.
KEYWORDS: musical sign, sense-making, experience, cognitive semantics, radical empiricism, con­
tinuous-discrete, percept-concept
Introduction
Is music something out there? A kind of artefact which is objectified, 
and that can be dealt with in a static way? Or does it rely on processes which call 
forth epistemic interactions with the sounds? Should we conceive of music us­
ers besides the music, and think about music as something which is perceived, 
conceptualised and enacted upon in order to be meaningful? This paper tries to 
answer these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that leans on the
seminal writings of Peirce, Dewey and James. Its central focus is on the role of 
musical experience and the way we make sense of sounding music.
Listening is not merely reducible to the richness of sounding stimuli but can be 
considered as a process of knowledge acquisition which is helpful in the semiotisa- 
tion of the sonic world. It has a role in the construction of knowledge with meaning 
being characterised in terms of the “experience” of the human beings who are doing 
the cognising. Our cognition, in fact, is not reducible to “naive realism” but has the 
mark of our cognising with our minds. Knowledge, thus defined, is the result of an 
ongoing interpretation that emerges from our capacities of understanding — this 
is “cognitive realism” — , that are rooted in the structures of our biological em­
bodiment but are lived and experienced within a domain of consensual action and 
cultural history.1 This is a basic claim of “cognitive semantics” that accounts for 
what meaning is to human beings, rather than trying to replace humanly meaning­
ful thought by reference to a metaphysical account of a reality external to human 
experience.2 The same holds true for “conceptual” or “mentalistic” semantics which 
state their priority over “real semantics” in stating that one cannot take for granted 
the “real world” as the domain of entities to which language refers. Rather, the 
information that speakers can convey must be about their construal of the external 
world, where one’s construal is the result of an interaction between external input 
and the means available to internally represent it.3
Music, in this sense, is a collection of sound/time phenomena which have the 
potential of being structured, with the process of structuring being as important as 
the structure of the music. As such, it is possible to go beyond a merely “structural 
description” of the music in favour of a “process-like description” of the ongoing 
process of maintaining epistemic contact with the music as it sounds.
Music and musicological research
Music as experience is not yet established as a major topic of research. 
There are prevailing paradigms which run through musicology such as historical 
research, music analysis and performance studies. New paradigms, however, are 
evolving which challenge some weaknesses and shortcomings of traditional ap­
proaches: (i) the subject matter of much music research is too narrow in focussing 
primarily on the western canon of art music (the common-practice tradition), (ii) 
music research deals basically with second order stimuli, relying on symbolic tran­
1 Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind. Cognitive 
science and Human Experience (Cambridge, Massachusetts -  London: MIT Press, 1991), 150.
2 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the 
Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 120.
3 Ray Jackendoff, Consciousness and the Computational Mind (Cambridge, Massachu­
setts -  London: MIT, 1987), 83.
scriptions rather than on the music as it sounds, (iii) there is a lack of operational 
terminology for describing the music as a temporal art and the process of dealing 
with the music; and (iv) there is need of techniques for visualising and recording 
the music and the reactions to the sounding music in a way that does justice to the 
scientific claims of exactness, completeness and repeatability.
Many of these claims are current topics of research with emerging research 
communities that focus on a kind of common paradigm which is articulated by four 
major claims: (i) music as a sounding art; (ii) the process of dealing with music; 
(iii) the role of the musical experience and (iv) the process of sense-making while 
dealing with music.
The first claim is an ontological one: it states that music is only real music when 
it sounds. This is an empiricist position, which stresses the firsthand information 
in perception rather than relying on second-order stimuli. It means that we should 
conceive of “music-as-listened-to” and “music-as-perceived”, rather than thinking 
and conceptualising of music at a merely symbolic level without any actual con­
nection to the music as it sounds. The claim is important as it challenges symbolic 
approaches, which deal with music merely at a mental level. The act of composing 
is a paradigm case, but even sight-reading and score analysis deal with notes — 
as symbolic reference to sounding things — rather than with music as it sounds.
The second claim concerns the role of “interaction” with the sounds, either at 
the actual level of real sounding music or at the virtual level of imagery and repre­
sentation. Real-time interaction, e.g., keeps step with the actual unfolding through 
time. It is obvious in many musical applications such as the traditional pedagogy of 
instrumental teaching — where the apprentice tries to imitate the teacher’s instru­
mental playing — , the act of playing music from a score and the act of improvising. 
Most of these interactions combine motor output and sensory processing with the 
aim to deviate as little as possible from the standard of performance. In all these 
cases, the mind is functioning as a central processing mechanism that co-ordinates 
the sensory input with the motor output (input-output mappings). It is possible, 
however, to go beyond this real-time processing and to perform mental opera­
tions which transcend the inexorable character of the unfolding of time. As such, 
the mind operates at a level of virtual simultaneity, which is working “outside of 
time” through mechanisms of anticipation and memory. This is the level of “mental 
computations” and “symbolic play”.4
The role of musical experience, thirdly, has received rather limited attention in 
existing musicological research. There are psychological studies and music reception 
and cognition studies, but musicology as a discipline is still waiting for a comprehen­
sive and theoretically grounded framework that explains the idiosyncrasies and com­
4 Mark Reybrouck, “Musical Creativity between Symbolic Modelling and Perceptual Con­
straints: the Role of Adaptive Behaviour and Epistemic Autonomy”, in Musical Creativity: Mul­
tidisciplinary Research in Theory and Practice, ed. Irene Deliege and Geraint Wiggins (Oxford: 
Psychology Press, 2006), 42-59.
monalities of listening behaviour. Yet, there is a considerable body of older theoretical 
writings that have dealt extensively with the topic of having an experience.5 Central in 
these writings is the tension between “percept” and “concept” and between the particu­
larities of the sensory experience and the conceptual labels that are applied to them.
The process of “sense-making”, finally, implies a shift from ontological (what 
is music?) to “epistemological questions” (what is music cognition and how can it 
be acquired?) with as major claim the “construction” of meaning out of the percep­
tual flux.6 It involves a semiotisation of the sonic world, which means that we must 
conceive of the music user not as a merely passive recipient but as an organism that 
tries to build up semiotic linkages with the world. In building up these linkages, the 
organism can rely on innate and acquired mechanisms of information “pickup” and 
information “processing”. As such, there is a tension between wired-in reactivity to 
the (sonic) environment — with reactions that behave like lock-and-key — and “medi­
ate reactions” which are the outcome of learning processes and cognitive mediation.
Dealing with music: processual 
and experiential claims
The processual approach to dealing with music is somewhat related 
to the early claims of cognitive musicology which stated that music is above all 
a human experience, not merely a set of artefacts or “structures”. This processual 
approach can hardly be overstated: music, as a temporal art, is characterised by 
“consumption” of time. In distinction to, e.g., a geometric figure, which is presented 
at a glance, music relies on the successive presentation of component parts. The 
listener, therefore, should bring together the particularities and idiosyncrasies of 
the sonorous unfolding and the more overarching principles of relational continu­
ity. As such, there is a basic tension between the “discreteness” and “successivity” 
of small temporal windows and the more global “synoptic overview.” The latter 
allows the music user to grasp the music in a simultaneous act of consciousness or 
comprehension7 but at the cost of the richness of the full perceptual experience.
5 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago-London: Open Court Publishing Company, 
1925); John Dewey, A rt as Experience (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958 [1934]); William Ja­
mes, Essays in Radical Empiricism (Cambridge, Massachusetts -  London: Harvard University 
Press 1976 [1912]).
6 Mark Reybrouck, “Biological roots of musical epistemology: Functional Cycles, Umwelt, 
and enactive listening”, Semiotica 134 (2001), no 1-4:599-663; Mark Reybrouck, “A Biosemiotic 
and Ecological Approach to Music Cognition: Event Perception between Auditory Listening and 
Cognitive Economy”, Axiomathes. An International Journal in Ontology and Cognitive Systems 
15 (2005), no 2: 229-66.
7 Rolf Inge Godoy, Formalization and Epistemology (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 
1997).
This tension between the “richness of experience” and “economy of processing”, 
however, is not typical of music, but is a major topic in the pragmatic philosophy of 
Dewey and James. Dewey, in particular, has elaborated on the concept of “having 
an experience’:
Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened vitality. Instead of 
signifying being shut up within one’s private feelings and sensations, it signifies active 
and alert commerce with the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration 
of self and the world of objects and events.8
This heightened vitality has adaptive value as well: it is exemplified in the life 
of the savage man who is in danger in a threatening environment. Observation, 
then, is both “action in preparation” and “foresight for the future” with the senses 
functioning as sentinels of immediate thought and outposts of action.
Having an experience, further, is not unidirectional with the senses as the only 
interface. Experience has pattern and structure because it is “doing and under­
going” in relationship. It is exemplified most typically in the artistic experience:
...art, in its form, unites the very same relation of doing and undergoing, outgoing 
and incoming energy, that makes an experience to be an experience. — Man whittles, 
carves, sings, dances, gestures, molds, draws and paints. The doing or making is ar­
tistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that its qualities as perceived have 
controlled the question of production. [...] The artist embodies in himself the attitude 
of the perceiver while he works.9
The perceptual experience in general is characterised by full and rich experi­
ence. It refers to the individual thing existing here and now with all the unrepeat­
able particularities that accompany and mark such existences.10 Most objects of 
our ordinary perception, however, lack this completeness, being short-circuited 
as soon as there is an act of recognition. The full perceptual realisation of just the 
individual thing we perceive is then replaced by the identification of something that 
acts as an index of a specific and limited kind of conduct. Aesthetic perception, on 
the other hand, is a real perceptual experience. It is characterised by the richness 
of full perception. A musical experience, in this view, is not basically different from 
an auditory experience at large. It is continuous with the “natural experience” or 
“experience proper” with a difference in degree rather than in quality.
A somewhat related approach to the fulness of experience was advocated by 
Jam es11 in his doctrine of “radical empiricism” that deals with the tension between 
“concept” and “percept”. It stresses the role of “knowledge-by-acquaintance” — as 
the kind of knowledge we have of a thing by its presentation to the senses — and
8 Dewey, A rt as Experience, 19.
9 Ibid., 48.
10 Ibid., 177.
11 James, Essays.
states that the significance of concepts consists always in their relation to percep­
tual particulars. What matters is the fullness of reality, which we become aware 
of only in the perceptual flux. Conceptual knowledge is needed only in order to 
manage information in a more “economical” way. As such, it is related to principles 
of “cognitive economy:”
We extend our view when we insert our percepts into our conceptual map. We learn 
about them, and of some of them we transfigure the value; but the map remains superfi­
cial through the abstractness, and false through the discreteness of its elements; and the 
whole operation, so far from making things appear more rational, becomes the source 
of quite gratuitous unintelligibilities. Conceptual knowledge is forever inadequate to 
the fullness of the reality to be known. Reality consists of existential particulars as well 
as of essences and universals and class-names, and of existential particulars we become 
aware only in the perceptual flux. The flux can never be superseded.12
From experience to sense-making: 
a real semiotics of singular potential
James” insights are of great value. In stating that knowledge should 
ultimately be debatable in terms drawn from experience, he provides a very promis­
ing conceptual framework for the description of music as a sounding art. As such, 
it is possible to go beyond a merely conceptual approach to cognition in stressing 
the role ofknowledge-by-acquaintance and bringing together the claims of having 
an experience and its embedding in a conceptual map.
This conceptual map, further, can be described in “semiotic terms.” Semiotics, 
in fact, holds a symbolic approach to cognition. Being concerned with sense-making 
and principles of cognitive economy, it relies on “signs” rather than on sensory 
realia. The question should be raised, however, as to the nature of these signs: do 
they refer to mental representations of the sounds — as in a musical score — , or 
to something external to the music? Should we conceive of “internal” or “external 
semantics”, or is it possible to bring both approaches together in a framework that 
goes beyond this dichotomy? There are three approaches that address this ques­
tion: (i) the discrete/continuous dichotomy, (ii) the percept/concept dichotomy 
and (iii) the internal/external dichotomy.
The “discrete/continuous dichotomy” is related to the distinction between 
categorical vs. acoustical perception. “Categorical perception” involves an act of 
recognition and assigns one discrete meaning to an event that is evolving over 
time. “Acoustical perception”, on the other hand, relies on acoustical listening and 
provides a phenomenological description of the sounds in terms of their acoustic
12 Ibid., 245.
qualities. Purely acoustical listening, however, is quite improbable: listeners do 
not perceive the acoustical environment in terms of its acoustic qualities but rather 
in terms of recognisable “events”.13 What matters, is not the continuous flow of 
sounding energy, but “music-as-heard” and the way the music user makes sense 
of it. Events, further, are continuous in their unfolding but discrete in their labe­
ling. They allow the listeners to “recognise” something rather than “experiencing” 
it as something that unfolds over time, with the danger that they stop acoustical 
processing in favour of conceptual labeling14.
The “percept/concept dichotomy” is related to the way hum an listeners 
structure the acoustic flow. Listening embraces both perceptual immediacy and 
conceptual abstraction. It brings together continuous and discrete processing, 
stressing both the idiosyncrasies of the sonorous unfolding — which is continuous
— and the process of sense-making which can be intermittent in applying discrete 
labels to slices of the sounding flux. This is basically the tension between the 
“bottom-up” and “top-down” approach with sensory information being presented 
to the senses in a continuous way and the mind applying discrete labels to chunks 
of information. The former provides the raw material — the percepts — which is 
processed in a bottom-up approach; the latter tries to reduce the complexity of the 
sounding flux to conceptual categories, involving a more economical top-down 
approach. As such, listening is both an “experiential” and “conceptual” affair.
The distinction between “internal and external semantics”, finally, is related 
to the previous dichotomies. Internal semantics is concerned with self-reference, 
with the identification of sonic events and their interrelations. It involves a herme­
neutic moment in defining “something as something” (e.g. the sound of a clarinet, 
a typical chord or cadential formula, etc.) with denotation of elements being de­
pendent on the process of recognition through identification and differentiation. 
What is eligible for denotation is not mainly reducible to extramusical reference, 
but is referring to the sonorous articulation and its identifying qualities. Music, 
in this sense, is a carrier of immanent meaning, with sounding elements — the 
musical denotata — as recognisable entities that can be assigned some meaning 
or semantic weight.15 The (external) reference, in this view, collapses to blend with 
the actual sound which acquires some conceptual quality. The denotation of the 
note “g”, e.g. does not refer to the vibratory sound event, but to the recognition of 
the category or class that embraces the actualisation of this event. The reference, 
therefore, is not external but internal to the musical system.
13 Viki McCabe, Gerald J. Balzano, Event Cognition: An Ecological Perspective (Hillsdale, 
New Jersey -  London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986).
14 Reybrouck, “A Biosemiotic and Ecological Approach”.
15 Mark Reybrouck, “The musical sign between sound and meaning”, in Music and Signs, 
Semiotic and Cognitive Studies in Music, ed. Ioannis Zannos (Bratislava: ASCO Art & Science, 
1999), 39-58.
Musical semantics, in this view, involves a process of sense-making that goes 
beyond a merely acoustic description of the sound. What matters are not merely 
the concrete-sounding events — the physical data — but also the abstract terms 
that are disengaged from their existential dependency from the particular things 
they are referring to. To delimit musical denotata  thus implies a generalised re­
flection of sonic reality, and this is a transition from “percept” to “concept”. Con­
ceptualisation, however, is discrete and symbolic rather than  continuous and 
analog. Sense-making, on the other hand, involves both continuous and discrete 
processing of the sound. What is needed, therefore, is a kind of musical semantics 
that is co-perceptual, in applying labels to focal points or temporal extensions of 
the sonorous unfolding that is continuous in its presentation to the senses. The 
labeling, for short, keeps step — is co-perceptual — with the perceptual experience 
proper, but is discrete in its assignment of conceptual categories.
Bringing together these dichotomies should provide a semiotics for which the 
abstract is really material, a real semiotics of singular potential, which is grounded 
in the real and natural experience.
Perceptual judgments and the symbolic 
approach
Music is a sounding art which is actualised in its sonorous articulation 
through time and which can be objectified by providing means for portraying the 
continuous acoustic signal. Making sense of music, however, must go beyond 
a mere acoustical description of the sound. What matters is not merely the con­
tinuous flow of m atter in the physical world, but the perceptual and cognitive 
processes of the knower, or put in other terms: how human listeners structure the 
acoustic flow. This is the basic tension between the “bottom-up” and “top-down” 
approach with a critical distinction between the richness of sensory experience 
and the economy of thinking: do the listeners process all the sensory information 
which is presented to their senses in a continuous way (bottom-up) or do they rely 
on cognitive mediation, with the mind applying discrete labels to a continuous 
unfolding (top-down)?
It is possible, in fact, to conceive of either sensory realia or their symbolic coun­
terparts, but it is reasonable to take a “realist position” as a starting point — this 
is the empiricist claim of perception — which means that there really is something 
“out there”, which is already structured in the environment. This calls forth the 
veridicality of perception and the possibility to speak of perception in objectiv- 
ist terms. Cognition, however, relies on principles of “cognitive economy” as well 
and the same holds true for music cognition, which relies both on experience and 
conceptualisation.
Conceptualisation, in fact, holds a “symbolic approach” to cognition. As a means 
for conceiving of something that is not physically present, symbolisation relies on 
signs in the scholastic conception of reference: aliquid s ta tp ro  aliquo. The sign 
process, in this conception, breaks up in something that signifies and something 
that is signified, which is, in fact, the Saussurian distinction between signifiant 
(that which signifies, the material sign vehicle) and signifié (that which is signi­
fied). This distinction has proved to be very fruitful for an operational approach 
to the sign process but has been lacking in not including the consciousness of the 
interpreter in the process. Semiotics, therefore, had to wait for Peirce who put the 
sign in a triadic relation of sign, object and interprétant:
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that 
person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it cre­
ates I call the interprétant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object.16
The problem of meaning, in this view, addresses the sign as well as the sign 
user and his/her disposition to react upon the sign. It calls forth the conception 
of interprétant which Peirce defines as the proper significate effects of signs.17
Musical meaning, accordingly, is not reducible to a mere series of sensations. 
What really matters are not the sounds proper, but the listener’s reactions to the 
sounds. This brings us to the three fundamental propositions of pragmatics as 
stated by Peirce.18 The first restates the famous adage of Aristotle: “Nihil est in 
intellectu quod non prius fu er it in sensu.’’ The term  intellectus, however, has 
a rather broad definition here, referring to all general ideas that are present in 
each possible kind of representation. The term sensus, on the other hand, is every 
“perceptual judgm ent” that is at the very base of critical thought. The second 
proposition states that each perceptual judgm ent contains general elements, 
allowing particular propositions to be restated as universal ones. And the third 
proposition, finally, states that our perceptual judgments are to be regarded as an 
extreme case of abductive inference, from which they differ in being absolutely 
beyond criticism. The abductive suggestion is an act of insight, an idea of putting 
together what we had never before dreamed of putting together and which flashes 
the new suggestion before our contemplation.19 This means that the perceived 
object is presented as a whole and as a unity before we even grasp its intelligibility.
16 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers o f Charles Sanders Peirce: Vol. 2. Elements of 
Logic, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1960), 135.
17 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers o f Charles Sanders Peirce: Vol. 5. Pragmatism 
and Pragmaticism  and Vol. 6 Scientific Metaphysics, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 326.
18 Ibid.
19 Peirce, Collected Papers: Vol. 5. and Vol. 6 ,112-13.
Categorisation and cognitive economy
The general elements in perceptual judgments call forth processes of 
categorisation, which are reducible to two major claims: the principle of cognitive 
economy and the principle of reality. Stressing the importance of providing the 
maximum of information with the least cognitive effort — this is cognitive economy
— they allow the cogniser to render discriminably different things equivalent, to 
group them into classes, and to respond to them in terms of their class membership 
rather than their uniqueness.20 This means that genuinely diverse inputs lead to 
single outputs, without preserving the shape, size, position and other formal char­
acteristics of the stimulus.21 As such, categorisation is used as a tool for managing 
a complex environment: it is fundamental to any sort of discrimination task and 
is indispensable in using previous experiences to guide the interpretation of new 
ones. Categorisation, further, mostly starts from the assumption of an implicit on­
tological realism — as advocated in the early work of Rosch22 — , claiming that the 
perceived world is not unstructured, but consists of real and natural discontinuities 
and co-occurrent properties. It takes the categories in the external outer world for 
granted, as advocated in “objectivist cognition” or “objectivist semantics”. Catego­
risation, however, does not deal with “ontological categories” but with “conceptual 
structures” which contain constituents differentiated by major ontological category 
features such as thing, place, direction, action, event, manner and amount, smell 
and time.23 As such, it brings together the claims of “objectivist“ and “conceptual” 
or “cognitive semantics”.
Listening, in this view, is a process of sense-making that reduces the virtual 
infinity of information of the perceptual flux to a manageable and limited set of 
perceptual “categories”. As such, it calls forth symbolic processing that relinquishes 
the particularities and idiosyncrasies of sensory experience in favour of forms of 
conceptualisation which process the incoming information in a much more eco­
nomical way. As such it is an important cognitive tool that transcends perceptual 
bonding and that allows “autonomous processing” that goes beyond temporal and 
spatial constraints.
Autonomous processing, further, is related to the use of “signs”. Dealing with 
music, in fact, is not reducible to direct reactivity to the sounding stimuli but involves 
processes that involve cognitive mediation as well. Central in this process is the shap­
ing of the human-environment interaction since the human being is not programmed
20 Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, George Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: 
Wiley, 1956).
21 Ulric Neisser, Cognitive Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967); Ulric 
Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco: Freeman, 1987).
22 Eleanor Rosch, Barbara Lloyd, eds. Cognition and Categorization (Hillsdale, New York: 
Erlbaum, 1978).
23 Jackendoff, Consciousness.
to react upon stimuli in a simple causal way (stimulus-response) but in a way that is 
mediated by a mediating instance. The pioneering work of Vygotsky24 is important 
here. Leaning upon Engels” concept of human labour and tool use as the means 
by which man changes nature and transforms himself, he extended the concept of 
mediation in human-environment interaction to the use of signs as well as tools:
The inventions and use of signs as auxiliary means for solving a given psychological 
problem (to remember, compare something, report, choose, and so on) is analogous to 
the invention and use of tools in one psychological respect. The sign acts as an instru­
ment of psychological activity in a manner analogous to the role of a tool in labor.25
The basic analogy between sign and tool rests on the mediating function that 
characterises each of them. As such they may be subsumed under the same cat­
egory of mediated activity. One major difference, however, is the different way 
they orient human behaviour:
The tool’s function ... is externally oriented; it must lead to changes in objects [...] The 
sign, on the other hand, changes nothing in the object of a psychological operation. It is 
a means of internal activity aimed at mastering oneself, the sign is internally oriented.26
The sign operation, then, requires an intermediate link between the stimulus 
(S) and the response (R), as a kind of “second order stimulus” that is drawn into 
the operation it fulfills. The result is a new relation between S and R, with the 
subject being actively engaged in establishing such a link. In this new process 
the direct impulse to react is inhibited, and an auxiliary stimulus that facilitates 
the completion of the operation by indirect means is incorporated. This auxiliary 
stimulus transfers the psychological operation to higher and qualitatively new 
forms of behaviour that break away from biological development and create new 
forms of a culturally-based psychological process. Or, as Vygotsky puts it: “All the 
higher psychic functions are mediated processes and signs are the basic means 
used to master and direct them ”.27
Musical sense-making and the use of signs
Signs are rather general and abstract in representing reality. Music, on 
the other hand, is a sounding phenomenon with the sonorous articulation as a pri­
mary category. The problem, therefore, is the tension between a general description of
24 Lev Vygotsky, Mind in Society. The Development o f Higher Psychological Processes 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts -  London: Harvard University Press, 1978).
25 Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language (Cambridge, Massachusetts -  London: MIT Press, 
1962), 52.
26 Vygotsky, Mind in Society, 55.
27 Vygotsky, Thought and Language, 56.
music at an abstract-symbolic level and the idiosyncrasies of the sonorous articulation 
which are concrete. Musical signs should encompass both categories of description.
A starting point can be the tripartition of Bense28 who distinguishes between the 
sign as a “means” — this is the material sign vehicle — that refers to an “object” and 
the meaning it is given with respect to an “interpretant”. Every sign thus operates 
at three levels that stand in a hierarchical relation to each other. The allocation of 
signs, therefore, proceeds from the material signal (the means) over the level of 
object to the level of the interpretant.
The central problem, however, is the relation between the sign as a means and 
its object. As contrasted with words or images that can be easily distinguished as 
a means from the object they refer to, it is not easy to distinguish the musical means 
from their objects. Music is not referring to extramusical “objects” in an unambigu­
ous way — there is no lexicon — , but is referring to itself. This could be stated in 
Saussurian terminology as a process where “signifiant” and “signifié” blend together.
Musical signs, in this view, should be elements of a self-referential semantics 
and their “denotation” should be defined on the basis of a process of recognition 
through identification and differentiation. Music, then, is the carrier of imma­
nent meaning, and the musical sign is a recognisable entity that is assigned some 
semantical weight. The denotative aspect of musical semantics, therefore, is not 
reducible to an extramusical reference in the strictest sense, but refers to delim­
ited segments of the sonorous articulation that acquire some conceptual qual­
ity. The reference, therefore, is not external but internal to the musical system. 
At the level of the means it is possible, further, to rely on the conceptual work of 
Peirce29 who distinguishes between three categories of signs, dependent on the 
rather qualitative character of the sign (qualisign), the singular or unique character 
of its appearance (sinsign) and the lawfulness of the sign (legisign). Translating 
this to the realm of music should read as follows: the sonorous articulation, in its 
sounding qualities can be defined in terms of qualisigns, the concrete and unique 
articulation as a sinsign, and the categories the listener assigns to the music as 
legisigns. This conceptual framework has been refined still further by Morris with 
regard to the generality of reference:
In so far as a particular act of pointing can denote only a single object, it has the state of 
an index [indexical sign]; if it can denote a plurality of things (such as the term “man”) 
then it is combinable in various ways with signs which explicate or restrict the range 
of its application [characterising sign]; if it can denote everything (such as the term 
“something”), then it has relations with every sign, and so has universal implication, 
that is to say, it is implicated by every sign within the language [universal sign].30
28 Max Bense, Zeichen und Design. SemiotischeÄsthetik (Baden-Baden: Agis, 1971).
29 Peirce, Collected Papers: Vol. 5. and Vol. 6.
30 Charles Morris, Foundations o f the Theory of Signs, Vol. 1, nr 2 (Chicago -  London: 
University of Chicago Press 1975 [1935]), 48.
The combination of “indexical” and “characterising sign” (e.g. this horse) is very 
fruitful. It unifies the definiteness of the reference of the indexical sign (f/jz's horse) 
with the expectation that is implied in the characterising sign (this horse). As such 
it combines an abstract and concrete approach to dealing with the sounds, and 
reflects the old epistemological problem of what Scotus called “Common Nature” 
and “Haecceity”. To quote Peirce again:
If Socrates is a truly man, there must be something “in” Socrates which is the basis 
for that assertion. In addition, there must be a principle by which Socrates is the real, 
unique, individual he is. Scotus calls the first principle the Common Nature, and the 
second the Haecceity [...] The word “haecceity” functions like “uniqueness” [...] Then 
haecceity is the “ultimate actualizing entity.31
These claims are rather general. It is possible, however, to translate them to 
the realm of music and to conceive of musical sense-making as an act of mental 
pointing that keeps step with the sonorous unfolding in a continuous process of 
epistemic interactions with the sounds. These interactions can be exploratory to 
a great extent -  in searching for new percepts and the distinctions between them -  
but they can trigger processes of recognition that activate patterns of schematic 
knowledge that are part of our cognitive structure as well (concepts). Speaking of 
a violin in general, e.g., does not imply the physical presence of an actual instru­
ment. It can be conceived at a merely symbolic level — as can be done with all 
meaningful units of a linguistic lexicon. As such, there is a dynamic tension between 
experience and recognition with the former capturing the temporal unfolding of 
the articulation of the sound, and the latter relying on processes of abstraction and 
generalisation.32 The former holds a dynamic-vectorial approach to the world and 
is directive in nature; the latter relies on distancing and polarisation between the 
cogniser and the world.33 *
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